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[L.A. No. 24576. In Bank. J!'eb. 1958.] 
ANGELA CHAVEZ et al., v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-~:E:ffect of Release or Compromise.-
The effect of Lab. Code, § that "No release of 
liability or agreement is valid unless it is approved 
by the [Industrial Aceident] a panel, commis-
sioner, or referee," is to make every compromise invalid until 
it is approved, and a ruling of the commission disapproving a 
compromise reached by an employee, suffering an industrial 
injury, and the employer's insurance carrier two days before 
the employee died of a nonindustrial heart condition could not 
be disturbed where the commission, at the time the compromise 
was before it for approval or disapproval, knew of the em-
ployee's intervening death, which death would normally termi-
nate any right to disability payments. (Lab. Code, § 4700.) 
PROCEEDING to review orders of the Industrial Accident 
Commission awarding benefits and disapproving a compromise. 
A ward affirmed. 
Levy, Russell & DeRoy and George DeRoy for Petitioners. 
Everett A. Corten, Edward A. Sarkisian, Talbot & Thomp-
son and George Thompson for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioners, who are the surviving widow and 
children of Jose Chavez, seek annulment of the respondent 
commission's award to them of certain benefits and of the 
commission's order disapproving a compromise. 
The employee, Jose Chavez, suffered an industrial injury 
in 1955. His employer furnished medical treatment and made 
temporary disability payments for approximately three 
months. Thereafter, the employee filed an application for 
adjustment of compensation, and the commission conducted 
a hearing on February 27, 1956. An oral agreement of 
compromise for $2,250 was reached by the employee and the 
employer's insurance carrier on the following day. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 58; Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 389 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: (1] Workmen's Compensation, § 70. 
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The insurer a written 
form supplied the commission and sent it to the employee, 
who executed it on March 1956. It was received by the 
insurer on March 14. On March however, the employee 
died of a nonindustrial heart condition. 'l'he carrier signed 
the and forwarded it to the commission for 
approval before of the 's death. The com-
mission, through its of the death and at 
the insurer's 'l'he order 
stated, in part, that the ''Commission, having eonsidered the 
entire reeord, now finds that it is not for the best interests 
of the parties to approve ... [the) Compromise and Release 
and that it should be disapproved, applicant having died 
prior to approval thereof .... " The findings and award 
simply reiterated that the death was the basis for such action. 
The widow and dependent children were granted benefits con-
sisting principally of unpaid compensation payments which 
were found to have accrued in favor of the employee prior 
to his death. Their petition for reconsideration was thereafter 
denied. 
The employee's dependents contend that although the em-
ployee died, there was still adequate consideration to support 
the compromise. [1] While this may be true, it is not 
controlling on the question of the effectiveness of the unap-
proved compromise or the question of the propriety of thE> 
commission's refusal to approve it in view of section 5001 of 
the Labor Code. That section provides: "Compensation is 
the measure of the responsibility which the employer has 
assumed for injuries or deaths which occur to employees in 
his employment when subject to this division. No release of 
liability or compromise agreement is valicl unless it is approved 
by the commission, a panel, commiss,ioner, or referee." (Em· 
phasis added.) 
Undoubtedly the Legislature, in enacting this section, was 
primarily concerned with protecting workmen who might agree 
to unfortunate compromises because of economic pressure or 
lack of competent advice. (See 1 Hanna, The IJaW of Em-
ployee Injuries and Workmen'" Compensation, p. 154.) How-
ever, the effect of the section, itR clear wordinft, is to make 
every compromise invalid until it is approved. (Employee's 
Credit Co. v. Industn'al Ace. 177 Cal. 46 [169 P. 1001]; 
Massachusetts etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 176 Cal 488 
r168 P 1050].) In conformity with the section, the written 
compromise agreement here contained an express provision 
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of the by the commission, therefore, 
clearly essc'ntial to its effectiveness. At the time that 
was before the commission for approval or 
the commission knew of the employee's inter-
death, which death would normally terminate any right 
§ 4700.) Under these 
of the commission disapproving the 
compromise cannot be disturbed. 
The award made by the commission and the order dis-
approving the compromise are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
'l'his case comes to us on a petition to review an order of the 
Industrial Accident Commission (hereinafter called the com-
mission) disapproving a compromise agreement made between 
an employee and employer. The majority correctly notes that 
a eompromise agreement to be valid must be approved by the 
eommission, and absent this approval the agreement is invalid 
(Lab. Code, § 5001). From this proposition the majority 
coneludes that where there is a disapproval of a compromise 
agreement by the commission there is nothing for an appellate 
court to review and the order of disapproval will not be 
disturbed. In reaching such conelusion the majority avoids 
the very question we were asked to review : Were the grounds 
stated by the commission in disapproving the compromise 
erroneous as a matter of law and thereby in excess of juris-
diction? 
At the outset there is the preliminary question of whether 
an order by the commission disapproving a compromise agree-
ment is subject to review at all, and if so, does its scope include 
the question we are here asked to review. Aceording to the 
provisions of section 5950 of the Labor Code, any person 
affected by an order of the commission may apply to the 
courts for a writ of review. It is clear that an order approving 
or disapproving a compromise and release comes within the 
provisions of section 5950 and a writ of review is available 
to a person adversely affected by such order (see Silva v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 68 Cal.App. 510, 515 [229 P. 870] ). 
However, in reviewing an order of the commission dis-
approving a compromise and release, appellate courts will 
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not annul it in the absence of an abuse of discretion (Stegeman 
v. Industrial Ace. 6 Calif. Cases 256; Dubendorf 
v. Industrial Ace. 7 Calif. Cases 191). To state 
an appellate court's authority in this connection in terms of 
the statute defining the scope of review (Lab. Code, § 5952), 
questions of law are open to court review on the ground that 
an erroneous ruling on matters of law is in excess of juris-
diction National Atdo. etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
80 Cal.App.2d 769, 772 [182 P.2d 634] ). Therefore, the 
question presented by petitioners, and which is now before 
us, is a proper one for review. 
The sole issue, then, is whether the grounds stated by the 
commission in denying petitioners' application for reconsider-
ation are erroneous as a matter of law. I refer specifically to 
the application for reconsideration, since that is, in essence, 
the final order and the one which we are reviewing. (See Lab. 
Code, § 5901; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
15 Calif. Comp. Cases, 226.) 
The pertinent parts of the commission's order denying the 
application for reconsideration revealing the grounds are as 
follows: "While it appears that the amount offered in settle-
ment constituted a compromise of defendants' [employer and 
insurance carrier] liability for any additional temporary dis-
ability indemnity, yet it appears that the main portion of 
the settlement sum was a compromise of liability for perma-
nent disability. Since death terminates disability (Lab. 
Code, § 4700) it would appear that the consideration for the 
settlement for permanent disability residuals had in a large 
part failed upon the employee's death. It is true that the 
parties had entered into an executed contract as between them-
selves but the Compromise and Release would not become 
effective unless and until approved by this Commission. A 
party to a contract may rescind if the consideration fails in a 
material respect for any cause (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. 4) 
and it thus appears that a party may rescind a contract other-
wise valid, when the consideration in whole or in part fails 
before the contract has been fully performed. 
''The Panel is of the opinion that the referee acted correctly 
in disapproving the Compromise and Release, upon defend-
ants' notice of rescission thereof." 
A reading of this order leaves no doubt but that the com-
mission in affirming the referee's order disapproving the 
compromise agreement and their denial of the application 
for reconsideration was predicated upon the belief that there 
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was a failm'd of thus justifying the rescission 
under section 1689, subdivision 4 of the Civil Code. Further-
more it is evident that there is no dispute concerning the facts, 
.md hence this issue of whether or not the death of the em-
ployee constituted a failure of consideration is a question of 
law and thereby a proper matter for review (see Reinert v. 
lndnst1·ial Ace. Com., 46 Cal.2d 349, 358 [294 P.2d 713] ; 
Winter v. lndustt·ial Ace. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 174, 178 
[276 P.2d 689]). 
That the death of the employee did not constitute a failure 
of consideration is clear. The survival of the employee, Chavez, 
was not in any way a material part of the consideration in 
the compromise agreement. Consideration is usually expressed 
as the "bargained for exchange" (Rest., Contracts, § 75). 
The compromise release states that Chavez released his rights 
to any permanent disability payments in exchange for $2,250 
he was to receive from his employer's insurance carrier; no 
mention is made that the employer or his insurance carrier is 
expecting Chavez to survive for any particular length of time. 
The employer and insurance carrier were obviously bargaining 
for this release; the whole object of the compromise was to 
obtain Chavez' release of his rights arising from the injury, 
anything else would have been pointless. In addition it is 
reasonable to assume that both parties were aware that if 
Chavez died his right to any disability payments would cease, 
and hence contracting with this in mind, the employer assumed 
the risk that Chavez might die before his period of permanent 
disability ran out. The fact that Chavez died before the right 
to any permanent disability payments accrued, did not affect 
the fact that he released the right to receive payments had 
he lived. The employer got exactly what he bargained for: 
Chavez releasing his claims against the employer arising from 
his injury. 
Having established that the grounds on which the commis-
sion based its order were incorrect as a matter of law, the 
order should be annulled and the cause remanded for appro-
priate commission action. 
This conclusion is not affected, as the majority opinion 
appears to imply, by the fact that the compromise agreement 
was not approved by the commission at the time of death of 
the employee Chavez. In other words the parties to a com-
promise agreement which has been submitted to the commission 
for approval cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement prior 
to the commission's approval or disapproval. It is true that 
48c.ld-U 
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section states that the compromise agree-
ment is not valid unless it is the commission, but 
this does not mean that the is ineffective and either 
is to rescind it at will simply on the ground 
that the is not valid until approved. To state it 
another way, the statute a compromise not valid 
unless the commission approves it not intended to afford a 
ground for rescission once the is submitted to the 
commission. To rescission on such basis would disrupt 
the orderly administration of and would be contrary 
to the principles for the conservation of the time and energy 
of the commission, and place each party at the caprice of the 
other in that rescission might occur any time after submission 
of the agreement to the commission but prior to the latter's 
action. Obviously, the commission could not disapprove such 
an agreement without legal or just cause. In other words 
the commission may not validly act arbitrarily or do what 
would amount to the same thing-base its conclusion on non-
existent facts or inapplicable rules of law. But this is just 
what the commission has done in this case and the majority 
here has approved its unauthorized action. 
For the foregoing reasons I would annul the order. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 19812. In Bank. Feb. 14, 1958.) 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Petitioner, v. 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and M. 
FRANCES BELLINGER et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Effect of Release or Compromise-
Approval by Referee: Rehearing.-The Industrial Accident 
Commission has authority to reconsider a referee's approval of 
a compromise or release agreement. (Lab. Code, § 115, 5001, 
5900-5911.) 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, §58; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 389 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 70, 212; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 212; [3] Compromise and Settle-
ment, § 8; Workmen's Compensation, § 70; [4] Workmen's Com-
pensation,§§ 70, 212, 218; [5, 6] Workmen's Compensation, § 190; 
[7, 8] Workmen's Compensation, §267; [9] Workmen's Compen-
sation, §§ 272(5), 272(7). 
